CO129-614-1 Commission of Inquiry into fire at West Point- report 26-5-1949 - 22-12-1949 — Page 38

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37. It must not be implied that if such action had been taken we con- sider that the major part of the contents of godown No. 2 would certainly have been saved. We could come to no conclusion about this on the evid- which we heard, but we should have felt that all possible steps to pre- vent destruction had been taken. Owing to the enclosed nature of the building and its large cubic capacity, its lack of partitioning, the fire being alight right from the beginning on several floors, the dessicating action of the extremely hot flame from the film, and the difficulties which firemen would encounter within from smoke and general obstruction, it is indeed doubtful whether the fires could have been extinguished or segregated, even were ingress to the godown effected at an earlier time.

Sending of the "Fifth Alarm":

39. There is a further consequence of the apparent absence of general control at that early stage. The "Fifth Alarm" which implies that a fire for the time being is out of control, that it is spreading rapidly, and involving surrounding property, was not sent till 0848; it was then given on Mr. Brund's instructions. We consider that the urgency of hav- ing more firemen present in the early stages warranted the sending of the "Fifth Alarm" before 0840. The fifth alarm when given brought an additional fire float and an appliance from Eastern Station together with their complement of firemen, Mr. Brand in his evidence informed us that he did not went all appliances to arrive simultaneously, as their placement would have been a matter of difficulty. We consider that these additional appliances, especially the fire float, might have been of great assistance in these carly stages, because of the additional manpower that would have heen available for the work of breaking in doors and windows on the seafront, and that the fifth alarm should therefore have been given earlier. If there was a danger of cluttering up the

fire area,

the Eastern appliance could have been stopped a short dis- tance away and called forward when required, The second fire float could hardly have impeded operations along the sea wall.

Action taken to Prevent the Fire Spreading:

39. When entry into Godown No. 2 was effected, the Chief Officer saw